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Abstract. This paper presents a solution for secure remote reconfigura-
tion of FPGAs. Communicating the bitstream has to be done in a secure
manner to prevent an attacker from reading or altering the bitstream. We
propose a setup in which the FPGA is the single device in the system’s
zone-of-trust. The result is an FPGA architecture that is divided into a
static and a dynamic region. The static region holds the communication,
security and reconfiguration facilities, while the dynamic region contains
the targeted application.
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1 Introduction
Remote reconfigurability is a feature from which FPGAs can benefit through
remote upgrades, conditional functionality and a reduction of the time-to-market
by selling products with limited functionality.
In this paper we propose an architecture that allows secure remote reconfig-
urability with a generic architecture based on a low-cost soft-core microprocessor
and cryptographic IP cores.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the most relevant
related work. In Sect. 3, our solution is explained in terms of assumption and
goals, protocol and algorithms and the hardware architecture on the FPGA.
2 Related Work
The most recent and most efficient architecture for secure remote reconfiguration
of FPGAs, was proposed by Drimer in [1]. His solution consists of a non-volatile
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memory that stores the received bitstream after the user logic in the FPGA
has performed security operations on the bitstream. The result is a solution
that ensures bitstream confidentiality and authenticity. It also prevents denial-
of-service attacks and guarantees the freshness of the bitstream. Most other
proposed solutions in literature show cryptographic weaknesses, as also described
in [1].
The difference with our solution is that we assume the FPGA to be the only
device inside the system’s zone-of-trust. Further, our architecture allows an easy
expansion of the cryptographic functionality.
3 Our solution
In this section, we describe our architecture for secure remote reconfiguration of
FPGAs. In the first paragraph we list the assumptions and goals that we started
from. The second paragraph describes the protocol that meets these goals and
the algorithms needed to execute the protocol. The last paragraph of this section
describes the implemented FPGA architecture.
Assumptions and Goals We aim at a solution in which the FPGA is the only
device inside the system’s zone-of-trust. As a consequence, we do not require
any secure external memory. We also want our solution to be suitable for many
FPGAs in the field being reconfigured by one central reconfiguration unit. More-
over, we do not want to store a list of secret keys, which brings up the need for
public key cryptography. Further, we do not want to rely on any trusted third
party. Finally, we assume that the updates of the reconfiguration occur only once
in a while, which causes the reconfiguration speed to be of minor importance.
Under these assumptions, we want to achieve the following security goals:
– confidentiality of the bitstream
– authenticity of the bitstream
– authenticity of the central reconfiguration unit and the FPGA
– extendability of the cryptographic functionalities
Protocol and Algorithms A standardized protocol that suits all our assump-
tions and goals, is the Station-To-Station (STS) protocol [2]. This protocol in-
volves hash functions, symmetric key encryption and decryption and the signing
and verification of digital signatures. The hash function we implemented is SHA-
256 and for symmetric key encryption/decryption we use AES-128. Because we
focus on the compactness of the implementation, we use elliptic curve cryptog-
raphy for the public key operations. This is shown in Table 1.
Architecture Fig. 1 shows the architecture that we implemented on a Virtex-II
Pro FPGA. The PicoBlaze is an 8-bit soft-core microprocessor. It is connected
through a bus with a communication block that takes care of the internet com-
munication. Although the PicoBlaze consumes very little FPGA resources, the
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Table 1. STS protocol using SHA-256 as a hash function and AES-128 for
symmetric key encryption and decryption. Signing and verifying is done using
elliptic curve cryptography.
CRU ES
key pair (a,A) key pair (b,B)
generator P generator P
CertA CertB , A
choose k1
Q1 = k1 ∗ P
Q1
−→
choose k2
Q2 = k2 ∗ P
K1 ‖ K2 = HASH(k2 ∗Q1)
C = EK1(Sb(Q1 ‖ Q2))
Q2 ‖ C ‖ B ‖ id ‖ CertB
←−
K1 ‖ K2 = HASH(k1 ∗Q2)
DK1(C)
verify Sb(Q1 ‖ Q2) using B
verify CertB using A
F = EK1(Sa(Q1 ‖ Q2))
CertA ‖ F
−→
DK1(F )
verify Sa(Q1 ‖ Q2) using A
EK1(HMAC(K2,msg) ‖ msg)
←→
architecture could be optimized by replacing it by an FSM. The block RAM is
used to store data and instructions and the cryptographic block incorporates
the implementation of the algorithms described in the previous paragraph. The
ICAP (Internal Configuration Access Port) is a component that handles the
reconfiguration of the FPGA.
The cryptographic block represents a total of 4760 slices, 19 (16 kbit) BRAM
blocks and 7 (18x18) multipliers. More details on the cryptographic part of our
solution can be found in [3].
4 Conclusions and Open Problems
We presented an generic architecture for secure remote reconfiguration of FP-
GAs. We implemented the standardized Station-To-Station (STS) protocol with
a focus on compactness.
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Fig. 1. Architecture in which the targeted application is implemented in the
dynamic region.
The problems to be solved in our architecture are the fact that the bitstreams
are too large to be stored in the clear inside the FPGA, which could (partially)
be solved by using bitstream compression or a change of the protocol.
Further, to counter the fact that most standardized cryptographic compo-
nents are not provably secure, a good solution would be to make these compo-
nents remotely reconfigurable too. This would, however, require a change of the
entire architecture.
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